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Abstract: The role of coercive control in women’s offending has been increasingly recog-
nised in law. Yet, there remains a significant blind spot that leads to grossly unfair outcomes
for women who are implicated in cases of serious violence with their abusive partners. This
article outlines the role that abusive relationships play in women being ‘associated’ with
an offence, being present at the scene and unable to withdraw and being implicated in the
police investigation. It argues that such relationships must be recognised in legal practice
and in the law, to avoid serious miscarriages of justice being enacted upon women who
have already been repeatedly failed by the State.
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[The general public] probably think that justice was served, … [that] we’re both
disgusting, horrific people, so we both should rot in prison, because again that’s
the perception that they have of the situation. … I was like a little puppet to him, if
he said ‘jump’ I’d say ‘how high?’. If he [told] me to sit there quietly and do nothing,
I would sit there quietly and do nothing, which I think for him was just a sense of
control more than anything. (Rosie, convicted of manslaughter, co-defendant with
partner)
For decades the ‘gendered pathways’ literature has identified domestic
abuse as key to women’s routes into offending, alongside other ‘struc-
tural, institutional and familial injustices and disadvantages’ (Barlow 2019,
p.29), such as drug use and childhood abuse and neglect (see, for exam-
ple, Daly 1992; Simpson, Yahner and Dugan 2008). However, in the past
few years the role of coercive control in women’s offending has become
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more widely recognised, after having been introduced as an offence in En-
glish and Welsh law in Section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (Barlow
and Walklate 2021). In this context, coercive control refers to a pattern of
behaviours that aim to ‘subordinate’ a person or make them ‘dependent’,
for example ‘by isolating them from sources of support’, as well as ‘acts of
assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or other abuse that is used to
harm, punish, or frighten their victim’ (Home Office 2015, p.4). The rele-
vance of coercive control to women’s offending has recently received par-
ticular public attention, in the wake of the high-profile case of Sally Challen
whose 2011 conviction for the murder of her husband was overturned in
2019 (R v. Challen [2019] EWCA Crim 916). Although the coercive con-
trol that Challen had experienced at the hands of her husband did not
provide a defence for murder (rather she accepted a plea of manslaughter
on the basis of diminished responsibility (Justice for Women 2017; Thorne
2019)), her legal team emphasised the impact of the coercive behaviour
on Challen, which gained a great deal of publicity (see Walklate and Fitz-
Gibbon 2019).
Meanwhile, over the last few years the Domestic Abuse Bill has been
rumbling through the political system. The resultant Domestic Abuse Act
2021 (passed in April 2021) places new emphasis on the ‘emotional, co-
ercive or controlling, and economic abuse’ that blights the lives of many
victims and survivors of domestic abuse (Home Office 2021). While the Act
has been welcomed for raising the profile of forms of abuse that fall out-
side the domestic violence archetype, in which ‘“violence” means “physical
assault”’ (Hunter 2006, p.751; see also Welle and Falkin 2000), the govern-
ment rejected submissions to include statutory defences that protect from
prosecution individuals who are compelled to offend because they are vic-
tims of domestic abuse. This is despite the legal parity that this would create
with the survivors of human trafficking (based on Section 45 of the Modern
Slavery Act 2015) (see Prison Reform Trust (2020) for full details).
Notwithstanding the recent legal developments to recognise coercive
control and the drive by third sector organisations to reduce the culpa-
bility of women implicated in offences where the experience of coercive
control is directly relevant, there remains a significant blind spot in the le-
gal system and in much academic work. That is, women who are implicated
in violent offences committed by their abusive partner, who are drawn in
as secondary parties using complicity liability (commonly known as ‘joint
enterprise’). In practice, this is women who are considered to have ‘en-
couraged or assisted’ a coercive and abusive partner to commit the act of
violence and are, therefore, convicted of the substantive offence, including
murder.
Drawing on interviews with female prisoners, elicited from two research
studies, this article argues that the abusive nature of the relationship with
their co-defendant is central to women being present at the scene of vio-
lence and unable to withdraw (a tightly-defined act that enables the cir-
cumvention of prosecution under complicity liability) or being implicated
in the offence during the police investigation. This article, therefore, of-
fers a rare insight into the deeply-troubling ways in which women are held
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responsible for serious violence perpetrated by their partners and how the
criminal justice system’s neglect of such experiences results in the unfair la-
belling of women’s actions and their grossly disproportionate punishment.
This neglect replicates and serves to deepen systemic failures of the State
to recognise the abuse that many of these women have repeatedly suffered
throughout their lives.
Women’s Co-offending and the Role of Domestic Abuse and Coercive
Control
Women commit a small proportion of overall offences and are primarily in-
volved in low-level and non-violent crime (Jones 2008). Yet when women
co-offend, particularly alongside men, they tend to be involved in more
serious, ‘gender atypical’ offences (Becker and McCorkel 2011, p.99), such
as murder (Jones 2008, see also Lantz 2020). During such incidents, how-
ever, women are less likely to participate in the violence itself due to gen-
der differences in ‘moral evaluations’, particularly when they are in small
groups when ‘group influence may be less pronounced’ (Lantz 2020, p.97).
In some cases, women have reported being unaware of offences involv-
ing their partner until they were ‘at the crime scene’, at which stage ‘it
was very difficult to back out’ not least because they were ‘scared’ (Mullins
and Wright 2003, p.820). Similarly, in a study by Welle and Falkin (2000)
women who admitted planning an initial crime, often described being im-
plicated in a more serious offence as, for example, their partner unex-
pectedly produced a weapon during an altercation, ‘suddenly raising the
stakes of women’s participation in the crimes’ (p.56). Research on women
involved in group offences including their partner, has therefore gener-
ated questions regarding the extent to which their involvement is agentic.
There has been significant debate about the reductive nature of po-
sitioning women either as entirely rational, independent agents of their
crimes, or as victims, unable to control their offending behaviour due to
experiences of coercion in intimate relationships (see Barlow 2016; Mullins
and Wright 2003). Rather Barlow (2016, p.29) calls on criminology to ex-
plore the ways in which agency and coercion are entangled; as coercion,
like ivy, wraps itself around women constraining their choices. Here, she
emphasises the ways in which ‘abusive, controlling and/or obsessive rela-
tionships with a male partner may influence a woman’s “decision” to of-
fend’ (p.69), with evidence suggesting that ‘domineering’ partners leave
women feeling cornered with ‘little choice’ but to participate in the offence
(p.475).
In a study of women convicted of non-violent offences (drug offences,
burglary and theft) with male co-defendants, one-third reported that they
were ‘equal’ partners in the crime, which they undertook ‘rationally’ or
based on their own ‘informed choice’ (Jones 2008).1 However, the major-
ity stated that they offended out of ‘love’ or as an outcome of a coercive
relationship. Those in coercive relationships did so ‘as a result of a direct
threat’ of violence made by their partner, including a threat to life (Jones
2008, p.154). Such threats occurred against a backdrop of severe and
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repeated domestic violence and coercive control, which demonstrated to
the women the violence competencies of their partner. Their experiences
were also layered on top of previous abuse suffered in childhood. These
findings challenge the notion of women as primarily ‘rational agent[s]’ in
co-offending groups (Jones 2008).
Research has shown that men use a ‘range of abusive techniques’ to per-
suade women to co-offend with them, including direct threats of violence
(Barlow and Weare 2019, p.91), manipulating women through controlling
their supply of drugs, or exploiting their declarations of love (Jones 2008).
This reflects developments in the understanding of coercive control, which
have highlighted the structural and systemic roots of abusive behaviour (in
gender inequality and oppression – see Stark (2007)), its patterned nature,
and its inclusion of both ‘repeated and cumulative’ physical abuse as well as
‘non-physical acts’, such as threatening behaviour, intimidation, economic
control and the restriction of the victim’s freedom (Stark 2009, p.1510). In
Mullins and Wright’s (2003) study, women involved in burglary offences
reported that their partners threatened them to comply or stated: ‘if you
love me, you’ll do it’ (p.820). In this way, Barlow and Weare (2019, p.92)
emphasise the risks of ‘dichotomising and categorising’ women’s experi-
ences of their relationships in line with traditional understandings of love.
Such issues are further complicated by women’s feeling of co-dependence
with their abusive partners, who persuade them that their co-offending is
an essential part of the relationship (Matthews, Matthews and Speltz 1991,
cited in Barlow 2016). Again, experiences of trauma and neglect in the
life histories of many women render them particularly vulnerable to such
pleas.
Developing Jones’s (2008) categories of women who offend due to love
and fear, Barlow (2016, p.69) argues that both must be understood in
the context of men’s coercive control and seen as part of the ‘contin-
uum of coercion’. For these purposes, coercion is defined as ‘an action or
practice of persuading, forcing or encouraging someone to do something
by using force, threats, abuse (including physical psychological, economic
and/or emotional), manipulation (including love or obsession) and/or con-
trol’ – techniques which ‘overlap’ one another (Barlow 2016, p.76). There-
fore, she argues, the relationships between male and female co-offenders
must be explored broadly to understand their role in women’s offending
behaviour.
Coercive Control and Women’s Experiences of Police Investigations
and Trials
The ‘continuum of coercion’ is also relevant to women’s behaviour after an
offence has been committed and to expectations of them during a police
investigation and trial. This is because women often normalise their ex-
periences of abuse, and coercive behaviour tends to be rationalised more
broadly, based on ‘patriarchal expectations of womanhood and femininity’,
which position women as ‘passive and submissive’ (Barlow 2016, p.78). In
Welle and Falkin’s (2000, p.57) US study, women involved with ‘romantic
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codefendants’ tended to blame themselves for their partner being arrested
and charged, and for being charged themselves, as they cast their criminal
behaviour in terms of the ‘rules of conduct’ set by their partner, which they
had ‘transgressed’. This is despite their involvement often being negligible,
if at all.2 One of the women in Barlow’s (2016) study, whose partner was
convicted of murder, maintained that she had ‘no idea’ that he had com-
mitted homicide but that she lied in court to protect him because she loved
him – although fear also appeared to be a factor (Barlow 2016, p.79).
Recognising the role of domestic abuse and coercive control on women’s
involvement in offences and on their responses during police questioning
and criminal trials is particularly important in the context of complicity
liability. This is because it allows women to be implicated in violent offences
committed by their partner and to be convicted of the substantive offence
(for example, murder) as secondary parties.
Complicity Liability and Women Co-Offenders
Complicity, or secondary, liability (what was also commonly referred to as
‘joint enterprise’) enables a person, or persons, to be convicted of a sub-
stantive offence committed by another (Crown Prosecution Service 2019).
In its current form, complicity liability requires that the secondary party
must intend to encourage or assist the principal party to commit the of-
fence, with knowledge of the essential facts of the crime (Reid, Sarch and
Walker 2019), or the ‘details of the offence’ (Ashworth 2006. p.422). In
practice, Ashworth (2006) argues, culpability is rooted in ‘the decision to
support the commission of the principals’ crime and the assistance is a prac-
tical manifestation of that support’ (p.411). Prior to 2016, in England and
Wales, women were arguably more likely to be convicted as secondary par-
ties, as ‘Parasitic Accessorial Liability’ (PAL) rendered those who could have
‘foreseen’ that a substantive offence might occur, liable for it. Although this
provision has now been abolished, foresight can be used as evidence of in-
tention (Crown Prosecution Service 2019) and research indicates that the
alteration in the law has led to little change in police and prosecution prac-
tice (see Hulley and Young in progress).
The experiences of co-offending women implicated in cases which draw
on complicity liability have been comprehensively detailed for the first time
in a recent report by Clarke and Chadwick (2020). The findings of this
study are explored in detail here due to its exceptional nature and rele-
vance to this article. The research involved a broad information gathering
element – to identify the number of women convicted in this way (in the
absence of any official data) – and included interviews with 21 women and
a case review and analysis.
The research found that 90% of the women convicted of serious violence
had not engaged in any violence – none had used a ‘deadly weapon’ that
caused the death of the victim (Clarke and Chadwick 2020, p.10).3 Those
who had used violence tended to have done so in a way that constituted ‘low
level’ harm, such as a ‘push’, ‘shove’, ‘slap’ or punch, which had often taken
place during a separate incident, prior to the substantive violence itself. In
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almost half of the cases, women were not at the scene of the crime. A large
proportion of the women in the study had experienced domestic abuse
in childhood or adulthood and almost half were experiencing domestic
violence at the time of their offence. In 87% of these cases, the co-defendant
was the perpetrator of this abuse (Clarke and Chadwick 2020), indicating
the possible constraints that these women faced in their involvement in the
offence.
During the police investigation and trial, women in the study were most
likely to be implicated in the offence based on their association with their
male partner or presence at the scene, rather than their active involve-
ment in the offence (Clarke and Chadwick 2020). Inferences regarding
the extent to which women ‘encouraged’ or were ‘in control of’ their male
co-defendant were made alongside claims that they conspired to organ-
ise the offence or could have foreseen what would occur. These assump-
tions were weaved around gendered narratives related to femininity, sex-
uality and motherhood that were often paradoxical, as women were por-
trayed as both ‘manipulative and non-agentic’ – ‘egging on’ yet ‘vulner-
able’ (Clarke and Chadwick 2020, p.27). This reflects gender stereotypes
that portray female co-offenders as ‘broken’ and ‘weak’ on one hand, but
‘rational’ and ‘calculated’ on the other (Barlow 2015, p.480). Against this
backdrop, disclosing experiences of domestic abuse, at the hands of a co-
defendant represented a ‘double bind’ for women, who were ‘damned
if they did’ and ‘damned if they didn’t’ (Clarke and Chadwick 2020,
p.17).
Research shows that concerns about credibility lead women to remain
silent in relation to their experiences of abuse, as there is a tendency for
legal professionals to take ‘men’s accounts of violence at face value’, while
assuming that women are lying (Hunter 2006, p.766). Women’s narratives
of abuse are often expected to be corroborated by ‘expert’ witnesses who
can provide evidence of a psychological injury. Problematically for women,
however, ‘while expert testimony may render women’s claims of violence
more believable, it also tends to present being a victim of domestic violence
as a disabling, individual, psychological condition, further deflecting atten-
tion from the responsibility of the perpetrator for the consequences of his
violence’ (Hunter 2006, p.754). In Clarke and Chadwick’s (2020) study,
some defence teams actively avoided the disclosure of domestic abuse, due
to concerns that it could strengthen the prosecution’s case, as women are
often held responsible for the violent behaviour of men (see Maher et al.
2020) and the consequences of male violence (see Thiara and Humphreys
2017).
In practice, prosecution counsel use women’s non action to argue that
they intended to assist or encourage the offence, such as ‘failing to stop
something happening or intervening’ during or after the incident (Clarke
and Chadwick 2020, p.20). A woman’s failure to withdraw is also signif-
icant, as ‘withdrawal’ can quash culpability or, at least, offer a defence
against it (Crown Prosecution Service 2019). Withdrawal must be clear and
timely, with steps taken to prevent the offence (Ashworth 2006), however
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women’s experiences of domestic abuse and coercive control are likely to
make withdrawal particularly difficult.
Possible Defences for Secondary Parties
It may be considered that women who actively assist or encourage their
male partner to commit the offence, and fail to withdraw, are able to draw
on general complete or partial defences to negate or lower their culpabil-
ity for the substantive offence committed by their partner. However, the
most relevant defence of ‘marital coercion’ was abolished in 2014. Sec-
tion 47 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 stated that: ‘on a charge against
a wife for any offence other than treason or murder it shall be a good de-
fence to prove that the offence was committed in the presence of, and un-
der the coercion of, the husband’ (Ashworth 2006, p.228). While it did
not require threats or risk of serious harm to the woman, it was neces-
sary to demonstrate that the wife’s will was ‘overborne’ by her husband
(Ashworth 2006, p.229). The defence was problematic in a number of
ways, including the requirements that the couple were married, that the
partner was present at the offence and in its complete denial of women’s
agency (Barlow 2016). However, it offered women a rare opportunity
to explain their offending in light of their partner’s coercive behaviour
(Barlow 2016).
Alternative defences, which tend to be most prevalent in cases involving
women who have suffered domestic abuse, include self-defence or loss of
control, but these are most relevant to cases in which women themselves
have been violent, which research shows is extremely rare in cases involv-
ing complicity liability (Clarke and Chadwick 2020). Duress offers a com-
plete defence for defendants who acted ‘in response to threats from an-
other person … or in order to avert dire consequences (called “necessity”
or “duress of circumstances”)’ (Ashworth 2006, p.219). However, duress
requires a ‘direct threat’ which aims to persuade the defendant to commit
a specific offence or an immediately dangerous situation (Ashworth 2006,
p.220) and it does not recognise psychological and ‘moral’ threats (Bar-
low 2016, p.73). It also cannot be used as a defence to murder (Ashworth
2006).4 For co-offending women, Jones (2008, p.161) suggests a modifi-
cation of the existing legal defence of duress, which reflects the marital
coercion defence, as it puts the onus on the prosecution to prove that the
woman had been the instigator of the crime.
Despite the recent legal developments outlined at the start of this arti-
cle, that have raised the profile of the impact of women’s experiences of
coercive control and abusive behaviour on their offending, there remains
little protection for women who are implicated in a serious violent offence
perpetrated by their abusive partner.
This article draws on interviews undertaken for two research studies to
highlight the ways in which women’s experiences of domestic abuse and
coercive control contribute to their convictions for serious violence, as sec-
ondary parties. Following a description of the methods, the article will de-
scribe the multiple and layered experiences of domestic abuse and coercive
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control that the women suffered. It will then go on to highlight how their
experiences of abuse at the time of the offence directly impacted on the
women being convicted of a serious violent offence perpetrated by their
abusive partner. First, by restraining the women’s choices in relation to
their presence at the scene, their ability to withdraw or their assistance or
encouragement of the offence. Second, by constraining the women’s en-
gagement with the police investigation, in turn supporting officers’ (often
gendered) inferences about women’s roles in ‘assisting and encouraging’
their partners. It concludes by arguing that the neglect of these issues in the
current law and legal practice lead to the unfair labelling of women’s ac-
tions and them receiving grossly disproportionate prison sentences. These
practices emulate and deepen systemic failures of the State to recognise
domestic abuse and coercive control in the lives of many of these women.
The Research Studies
This article draws on interviews with twelve women, undertaken for two
research studies. The interviews were selected because all women were con-
victed of serious violence alongside their intimate partners (out of a total
of 21 women who were convicted in trials with (any) co-defendants across
both studies) and the law on complicity liability was used in the case. Of the
twelve women, ten explicitly stated in surveys that they were ‘convicted of
joint enterprise’ – one did not believe she had been and the other did not
conduct a survey. However, analysis of their interview transcripts revealed
that they were convicted alongside others in a way that indicated the use
of complicity liability. The 57% of women who were convicted with their
partners is a higher proportion than the one-quarter of women convicted
with their ‘romantic codefendant’ in Welle and Falkin’s (2000, p.49) study,
which may reflect the increased likelihood of women co-offenders being
involved in more serious offences (Jones 2008; Lantz 2020). It is worth
noting that while almost all of the women’s co-defendants were their male
partner, two of the twelve women were convicted with their female partner.
The first research study from which the interviews were drawn ex-
plored the experiences of men and women who were given life sentences
with a tariff of 15 years or more when they were 25 years old or younger
(see Crewe, Hulley and Wright (2020) for full details). Between 2013 and
2014, interviews and surveys were undertaken with 23 women, which rep-
resented 72% of the women who fitted the research criteria at the time.
Twenty-one women took part in interviews, all of whom were convicted
of murder and 16 (76%) of whom were convicted at trials involving co-
defendants.5 Of the 16 women, nine were convicted with their partner (of-
ten with others involved too, who tended to be their, or their partners’,
peers).2 The interviews explored the experience of long-term imprison-
ment itself, including forms of adaptation and relationships with people
inside and outside prison. For the purpose of this article, it is important to
note that the women did not always talk in detail about the offence itself or
their relationships with the people they were convicted alongside, as they
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TABLE 1
Demographic Information of Women Convicted of Serious Violence with their Partner (n = 12)
Number of
women
Age at interview 20–30 years 9
30–40 years 3
Ethnicity White British 8
Mixed race – White and Asian 2
Undisclosed 2
Conviction (offence) Murder 9
Manslaughter 2
Grievous bodily harm (Section 18) 1






Co-defendants Partner only 3
Partner and peers (including family) 9




Age at sentence 16–18 years 3
19–25 years 9
(Note: * Nine sentence lengths are minimum terms ranging from 17 to 23 years; three are determi-
nate sentences between nine and 21 years. The high number of women serving indeterminate life
sentences of 15 years or more is due to the sampling criteria in the first study.)
were not asked explicitly to do so. However, they were given the space to
if they wished, and some did.
The second study explored the application of ‘joint enterprise’ in prac-
tice and young people’s knowledge and experience of this area of law.7
Semi-structured interviews were completed in 2018 with four different
samples, including prisoners who had been convicted of a serious vio-
lent offence at a trial involving complicity liability (see Young, Hulley and
Pritchard (2020) and Hulley and Young (2021) for more details). This ar-
ticle draws on interviews with the female prisoners, of whom there were
five in total. Three were convicted alongside their partners (and, in one
case, a friend of their partner). The interviews asked about the women’s
life histories, their experiences of violence, the offence of which they were
convicted, and their experience of the investigation and trial.
The interviews in both studies ranged in duration – from one to three
hours – and were all audio-recorded and professionally transcribed verba-
tim. The data were analysed using a computer software package (NVivo).
The interviews were analysed using a reflexive, iterative approach in which
the data were revisited and connected to ‘emerging insights’ and to refine
understanding of the issues (Srivastava and Hopwood 2009, p.77).
The demographic data of all the women included in this study, across
both research studies, are reported in Table 1. It is important to note that
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of the twelve women included in this article, only one self-identified as
the principal party, five identified themselves as a secondary party, four
did not know and one did not believe she was convicted using secondary
liability (one did not comment). It is notable that at least a third of the
women were unsure of their status, although it is clear from descriptions of
their cases that the majority would have been considered secondary parties
rather than a principal offender. The findings of the research are outlined
in detail below.
Domestic Abuse in the Life Histories of Women and their
‘Co-offending’ Relationships
As found in much of the research on women convicted of violent offences,
all of the women’s narratives were saturated with multiple experiences of
violence, control and abuse at the hands of significant men in their lives.8
All had experienced violence, sexual violence or coercive control as young
children within their family home or as teenagers in their early intimate
relationships, and very often both. Many described their histories of vio-
lent and sexual victimisation as central to their pre-prison vulnerabilities,
including mental health problems and drug and alcohol addiction. There-
fore, a key feature of these women’s lives was the multiple layers of abuse
they had suffered prior to being convicted.9 Such experiences, they ex-
plained, had often been missed or ignored by State agencies, such as social
services, or attempts to remove them from abusive households as children
had led to further experiences of abuse in children’s homes or foster fam-
ilies.
Against this backdrop of abuse, the majority of the women convicted
with their male intimate partner (although not all) testified to being sub-
jected to serious violence, coercive control or both, by him:10
[Prior to the offence] I got with one of my co-defendants and I couldn’t even stand
him, I hated him to be honest, he was violent, and I was scared of him. (Carly,
convicted of murder)
Many of the women reported that acts of physical violence were recurring
and sometimes extreme. For example, Eloise (convicted of murder) de-
scribed her partner, and co-defendant, as ‘a very, very violent person’. A
significant number of women reported that they believed that they would
have lost their lives at the hands of their violent partner had they not come
to prison: ‘if I was still out there I think me and him would still be together,
and he would still be beating me. He’d have probably ended up killing me’
(Tamara, convicted of murder).11
For most, these multiple and frequent acts of violence were very often
accompanied by their partner engaging in psychological torment, threats,
economic oppression, sexual violence and social isolation – acts that reflect
Barlow’s (2016, p.69) ‘continuum of coercion’:
He was abusive in every context of it, so mentally, physically, sexually, the whole
lot. The mental cycle, it was a lot worse than anything else because it still leaves you
even now with a lot of issues. But it could start with the smallest of things and just
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escalate so quickly and then you’d be fine again and somehow it would still be your
fault. (Rosie, convicted of manslaughter)
Did you have anyone else who you confided it in at that time [about the abuse]?
No, because I wasn’t allowed to see my friends or talk to them. (Meg, convicted of
manslaughter)
The abuse that the women suffered was rooted in, and exacerbated by,
their existing vulnerabilities, including their young age, their drug and
alcohol issues, their early experience of abuse and neglect, and addi-
tional harrowing experiences of trauma, such as the death of a child. For
example, Tamara (convicted of murder), who met her partner (and co-
defendant) at the age of 14 years, had been sexually assaulted and raped
on multiple occasions between the ages of two and six years in consecutive
foster homes and had gone on to experience the death of two children.
Against this life history, she had ‘felt secure’ for the first time with her
partner.12 However Tamara’s vulnerabilities and her partner’s coercively
controlling behaviour led to feelings of co-dependence and undermined
her ability to ‘act autonomously’ (Hunter 2006, p.741): ‘I never used to be
able to make decisions, I’d always have them made for me [by my] baby
father’ (Tamara, convicted of murder). Sara (convicted of GBH), who de-
scribed herself as having been ‘groomed’ from the age of 14 years by her
partner (and co-defendant), reported similar feelings:
I feel like I was co-dependent on him because for me he was someone I needed and
I couldn’t live without him … I knew I didn’t want to live with him, I didn’t want
him to be in my life. But it was very difficult for me to end it with him because I was
still co-dependent with him and his money and he made all the rules.
Were you scared of him?
I’m still scared of him now. Yes. I’m very scared of him and I was then. This is why
I’m in prison. (Sara, convicted of GBH)
The feelings of co-dependence and the continued fear that Sara reports is
very common among women who have an abusive partner, despite Sara
having spent nine years away from her partner while in prison. As Hunter
(2006) explains: ‘One severe beating could terrorise a woman for life, with-
out the need for the perpetrator ever to lift a finger again’ (p.757) (see also
Welle and Falkin 2000). Fear was rooted in the women’s knowledge of their
partner’s competency as a dangerous avenger:
Whenever we used to have a big argument, or I used to get really mad he always
used to say about if I ever left and took our child he would literally kill me.
So when he made threats, did you believe that?
Yes.
Why?
Because when somebody is literally beating the crap out of you and saying it you
believe that they have the capability of doing it. If this person could sit there and
literally knock the crap out of you when you are just lying on the floor and taking
it, what on earth makes me think that he wouldn’t go further? (Rosie, convicted of
manslaughter)
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Many believed that their partner could, or would, kill them, not least be-
cause they had threatened to do just that on numerous occasions:
At any point, did you think it was a possibility that you might die in this relationship?
Yes. One million percent. Every time. Because he lived at the back of the [river] and
he always used to say to me, ‘I could kill you and bury you and nobody would even
know where you are’. (Meg, convicted of manslaughter)
Such threats were also sharply understood in the context that calling the
police was too risky or futile. When asked why she had not reported her
partner’s abusive behaviour to the police Rosie explained:
A couple of reasons, one, because most of the time [my partner] was there and I’m
not really going to call the police on him if he’s there and, two, it was pure fear. I had
nowhere to go. Anywhere I would have gone he would have found me and I know
the situation would have just got so much worse if I’d just left. (Rosie, convicted of
manslaughter)
There was also a common belief among the women that any calls for help
or protection would not be heard by State agencies, based on their previous
experiences of the social welfare and criminal justice systems (see Barlow
2019). In such circumstances, women developed coping strategies to deal
with the violence that they endured including minimisation (Hunter 2006).
As the following section demonstrates, women’s sensitivities to the acute
danger they faced and the strategies they used to normalise the abusive
behaviour had clear implications in terms of both their presence at the
scene of the violent offence for which they were convicted and their ability
(or not) to withdraw.
The Relevance of Coercive Control or Abuse to the Serious Violent
Offence
A number of the women were present at the scene of the serious violent in-
cident perpetrated by their partner (and sometimes peers) for which they
were convicted. While presence alone is not enough to satisfy the legal re-
quirements for complicity liability, it may be interpreted as assistance or
encouragement in particular circumstances, for example when numbers
embolden the perpetrator (Crown Prosecution Service 2019). However,
rather than offering support to their partner, the women here felt com-
pelled to be in situ and unable to leave once (often spontaneous) violence
erupted, due to the controlling and abusive behaviour of their partners.
For example, Tamara, who was at the violent incident in which her part-
ner and his friend killed the victim explained that she had ‘no contact’
with the victim, like the majority of the women in Clarke and Chadwick’s
(2020) study. Despite reflecting that ‘I should have either tried getting out
of there and calling the police, or tried stopping what happened’ (Tamara,
convicted of murder), and feeling intense remorse and guilt for not doing
so, Tamara explained:
I was scared; I was worried what they were going to do to me, but any normal
person would have probably tried to stop them. And I didn’t try nothing, I just sat
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there and cried my eyes out like, ‘Please stop!’. … I think I just froze, and I don’t
know what actually – I didn’t actually see what happened, all I can remember is
they were saying he was dead and I was like, ‘Ooh, what?’.
In this excerpt Tamara indicates the reasons why women who are in abu-
sive relationships with co-defendants may feel unable to stop the violence
or withdraw from the scene. This also exemplifies the role of fear in abu-
sive relationships and the way in which experiences of abuse wrap around
women constraining their choices (Barlow 2016).
Sara, who admitted assisting her partner by organising a meeting be-
tween him and the victim, described the extreme acts of abuse, and associ-
ated feelings of fear for herself and her family, that led her to do so:
I didn’t know [my partner] was going to stab [the victim] but … I never had a choice
basically. [My partner] told me, ‘If you don’t [set up a meeting], I’m going to take
our son back to his country and I’ll kill you and your family’, and I was really scared
and I still believe it to this day that if I didn’t do it I wouldn’t be here today. So it
was kind of an eye for an eye. It’s my life and my son’s or this man’s life. I know that
sounds crazy but there was not one bit of me that wanted to have [the victim] hurt
but I felt like I had no choice. … two days before [the incident] [my partner] said,
‘Have you done it yet?’ The atmosphere in the house, everything was just horrible
and I felt like I had no way out. He wouldn’t let me go to work, I lost my job, my
son wasn’t going to nursery. He locked me in our bedroom and he cut himself in
front of me and he said, ‘If you don’t set him up I’m going to do this to you’. I was
traumatised. He even raped me like on the lead-up before I come to prison. I felt
like I wanted to die. Yes, so I ended up [organising a meeting between my partner
and the victim]. (Sara, convicted of GBH)
In her narrative Sara explains that she felt that she had ‘no choice’, em-
phasising the contextual limits to her sense of agency. The severity of the
abuse Sara suffered also calls into question the relevance of traditionally
white, male notions of rationality (Lloyd 1979) and highlights the role of
fear in women’s experiences of co-offending (see Barlow 2019). It also chal-
lenges legal understandings of ‘duress’ for women who require a defence,
in circumstances in which they admit assisting or encouraging their part-
ner, like Sara. While common responses to Sara’s plight might be to suggest
she ought to have contacted the police to report her partner’s threats prior
to the offence taking place, the participants in the studies reported systemic
barriers to this feeling possible. For example, Meg commented:
… there was no way I would have rang the police on the outside, because I didn’t
get on with the police myself. (Meg, convicted of manslaughter)
Poor relationships with the police often corresponded with a fear of ‘puni-
tive state responses’ (Barlow 2019) and broader attitudes towards the ‘sys-
tem’ as illegitimate. Such feelings tended to be the result of social services
or the police being unresponsive when women had reported abusive be-
haviour in the past, or failing to protect and support women when they
made attempts to leave their abusive partners (Centre for Women’s Justice
2021), all of which discouraged them from doing so again:
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I think that makes you more bitter with the system, because you think you’ve gone
to them for help and nothing has happened. (Jackie, convicted of murder)
It is relevant to the ways in which women are implicated in violent offences
committed by their abusive partners to note that a number of the women
reported that they were not present at the scene of the violent incident
perpetrated by their partner, although some were nearby, for example in
another room or in the next street. These women exclusively reported that
they were neither aware that serious violence was planned nor knew about
it in the aftermath:
It was just an absolutely ordinary day, there was nothing with him or anything that
would make you think something is not right. (Rosie, convicted of manslaughter)
Similarly, Fiona, who had been at a different address at the time of the
homicide she was convicted of explained:
I didn’t know what had happened so it was like when [the police] knocked at my
door it was like ‘what’s gone on now?’ kind of thing. (Fiona, convicted of murder)
However, these women reported that it was being in a relationship with the
principal offender that implicated them in the offence, as the police made
inferences about what they knew prior to or after the violence took place
(see also Clarke and Chadwick 2020). This reflects broader research that
shows that women are more likely to be identified as offenders in the crim-
inal justice system than as victims (Barlow 2019).
Women’s Abusive Relationships in the Context of the Police
Investigation and Trial
The women’s experience of the police investigation and trial was often im-
pacted by the abusive nature of the relationship with their co-defendant.
Despite knowing the violent competencies of their partners, many reported
being in shock in the initial aftermath due to having witnessed their partner
commit a serious act of violence against another or as a result of hearing
the details of the incident from the police:
[I was] confused to why he did it and the more I thought about it, it made less and
less sense. I think I felt guilty in a sense that I wound him up so much more than
she ever did, so why her and not me? (Rosie, convicted of manslaughter)
Alongside this, women were bewildered as to how they had become im-
plicated in the police investigation as suspects, particularly if they had not
been present at the violent incident itself:
It was that real confusion of why are you thinking that I would have done this, what
on earth is going through … It’s almost like you are thinking ‘you are really stupid’.
You are kind of thinking how on earth can you sit there and actually logically think
that I’ve done this. (Rosie, convicted of manslaughter)
Many were deeply confused due to their ignorance of the law of complic-
ity liability and their inherent assumptions about ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’. It
seemed incomprehensible that a person could be charged with murder,
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or another serious violent offence, if they had not been violent themselves
(or been present at the violent incident). Yet their culpability was simply
derived from their association with a violent man (Clarke and Chadwick
2020):
Even though I didn’t know anything about what was going to happen, they’re trying
to say I did. Because it was my boyfriend at the time. So we got done for joint
enterprise. (Meg, convicted of manslaughter)
As his partner, they logically turned round and said that I must have known at some
point, being his partner and living with him. (Rosie, convicted of manslaughter)
Such experiences generated fear among the women as they became in-
creasingly uncertain of the outcome and their futures (similar experiences
have been reported for female asylum seekers involved in the immigration
system, Canning 2020).13
During initial investigations, in which women were either brought in by
police as potential witnesses or arrested as suspects, the abuse their part-
ner perpetrated impacted their willingness to engage. Women felt torn be-
tween wanting to talk to the police and feeling that they needed to remain
loyal to the person they loved:
I was still in love with this boy. I didn’t want to grass him up to the police or anything,
but then I didn’t want to lie to them as well, just in case I got found out, which would
have got me into trouble. (Meg, convicted of manslaughter)
The love and loyalty that women felt towards abusive partners were inex-
tricable from the concerns they held regarding the needs of their children.
On the whole, they felt strongly that their children needed their father to
be present in their life, rather than in prison. These concerns represented
the stereotypical expectations of a ‘good’ mother, who should make sacri-
fices (including risking their own safety and ‘autonomy’) to satisfy the needs
of their children (Weare 2017, p.204).
As the continuum of coercion (Barlow 2016) recognises, though,
women’s feelings of love, loyalty and care for their partner were often en-
tangled with fear – fear of him and fear of how they would live without him
due to feelings of co-dependence. Both propelled women towards lying to
the police, as Sara illustrates:
I was scared. I remember having a big loyalty thing towards him and it was more
so because I was scared of him but I knew if I wanted him back now I could have
him back. That, for me, I couldn’t live any other way. I saw him and nothing else.
(Sara, convicted of GBH)
A small number of women reported that the police demonstrated some
recognition of the abusive nature of the relationship between the women
and their co-defendant, as they reassured them that they could protect the
woman:
When we were arrested, when we had our interview … [the police said] if he was
threatening me, they would look after me and all that kind of stuff. So if I would
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have known something, at every opportunity, could have said, completely knowing
that he was going to go to prison for what he did. (Rosie, convicted of manslaughter)
However, Rosie (who was initially arrested for perverting the course of jus-
tice) reported that, once she began to talk, concern was replaced with sus-
picion. In this way she felt tricked:
[The police] kind of smile at you and they comfort you and they say it’s all going
to be okay. … They ask you such personal things and you open up about things
that maybe you’ve never even told anyone and things like that just so that they can
sit there and go, ‘Do you know what, actually I think that she did this’, or, ‘she did
that’. That is really, really heart-breaking. (Rosie, convicted of manslaughter)
These reflect broader fears reported by victims of domestic abuse and co-
ercive control, who ‘fear the system’ and fear the impact that their engage-
ment with the system might have on their access to their children, for ex-
ample (Walklate and Fitz-Gibbon 2019). In the current study, women re-
ported that they felt judged from the outset and that gendered narratives
were present during the investigation and trial:
[The police] judged me straightaway, and they didn’t even know me. They blatantly
told me that apparently I murdered someone – no I didn’t! Was you there? Did you
see me murder someone? (Tamara, convicted of murder)
They made out that I was this mastermind criminal, really nasty horrible person,
that our relationship was perfectly healthy and normal and that I was just this evil,
vile and heartless person that just played sweet and innocent very well. (Rosie, con-
victed of manslaughter)
Women believed that they were seen as responsible for ‘encouraging’ their
partner simply by their presence, or for planning the offence with him.
Such narratives reflected gender stereotypes of women as both ‘broken’
and ‘weak’ and ‘rational’ and ‘calculated’ (Barlow 2015, p.480). In the con-
text of such gendered narratives, women often chose not to disclose their
experiences of abusive and coercive control (Clarke and Chadwick 2020),
sometimes not even to their defence team. This was for the same reasons
that they lied to police – because they loved their partner or feared they
would suffer retaliatory violence.
The women who did disclose the abusive nature of their relationship
with their co-defendant during the investigation or trial, reported that
their previous non-reporting of abuse was interpreted as a lack of ‘evi-
dence’, which undermined their credibility (Centre for Women’s Justice
2021):
We could only say so much [about] things like the violence and stuff, because there
was no proof because obviously I never rang the police or anything, there was no
proof of it. So I know that my QC and things did stand up and explain the fact that
in those relationships if somebody is just beating you, they are not going to let you
ring the police, it’s not that simple. (Rosie, convicted of manslaughter)
The lack of corroborative evidence (see Hunter 2006), meant that narra-
tives of coercive control could be turned on their head. When asked how
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she felt being portrayed to be the ‘criminal mastermind’ of the case, Rosie
responded:
I think it’s absolutely disgraceful. … you don’t know me, and to sit there and say
that our relationship was normal, [that] I was more of the controlling one was really,
really hard to hear. It took me a really, really long time to even accept the things that
he had done and to even admit the fact that I was in a domestic violent relationship
for so long, I didn’t see it. Even when I came [to prison] I used to make excuses
why he did the things that he did. It took a long time and a lot of help to actually
come to terms with that and then to stand there [in court] and have somebody turn
round and say that actually it was okay was really, really difficult. (Rosie, convicted
of manslaughter)
Rosie’s experience resonates with broader research findings, which show
that men make counter-allegations about the women’s abusive behaviour
(Burman and Brooks-Hay 2018, p.76) and that criminal justice and social
institutions ‘engage in denial, minimisation excuses, and victim blaming,
rather than holding men accountable for their behaviour’ (Hunter 2006,
p.743). Despite the introduction of the laws on coercive control, research
shows that there has been inconsistent implementation across police forces,
due to a lack of recognition of behaviour as coercive and a broader lack of
understanding among practitioners (Walklate and Fitz-Gibbon 2019). The
combination of the ignorance about coercive control and domestic abuse
and misogynistic attitudes within the criminal justice system (Centre for
Women’s Justice 2021) means that women are likely to be disadvantaged
in reporting their experiences of abuse during a trial in which they are
a secondary party, as they are inadvertently reporting knowledge of their
partner’s violence, for example (see Clarke and Chadwick 2020).
The abusive nature of the relationship could also continue to bear down
on the women during the investigation and trial as partners attempted to
retain their tight grip by ‘dragging’ their female partner down with them.14
In Meg’s case, her partner explicitly implicated her in the case despite
evidence to the contrary, which she saw as another example of his coercive
control:
[He lied to implicate me] because he’s so controlling. Everywhere he goes, I have
to go with him. And when he got arrested for smashing [some] windows, he said to
me, ‘if I ever go to prison, I want you to come to prison, so I know where you are
and what you’re doing’. (Meg, convicted of manslaughter)
Research has shown, more broadly, that often male co-offenders pressurise
their female partners to take the blame for offences that they compelled
them to commit (Barlow 2019), given the low threshold for secondary lia-
bility they only have to suggest their partner ‘assisted or encouraged’ them
to implicate them.
In Meg’s case, her partner’s abusive behaviour continued in court:
He would try and turn around and speak to me, but the officers put me right in
front of him, so he couldn’t turn around and look at me. And if he had tried to
stand up, the officers would have stood up so he couldn’t get to me or see me. But
the worse thing he would do was write a load of lies on a piece of paper, because I
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was behind him, and he would hold it up like that, so I could see it. So he could get
a reaction out of me. (Meg, convicted of manslaughter)
In such cases women continued to be abused during their court hearing,
due to the legal requirements of the trial process, and the lack of recogni-
tion of the coercive nature of the relationship with their co-defendant.
Discussion and Conclusion
The stories of the women reported in this article highlight the pervasive na-
ture of domestic abuse and coercive control in their life histories and their
relationships with their male co-defendants. This occurs in two ways: first,
by restraining women’s choices related to being present at the scene and
withdrawing, or assisting or encouraging their partner in committing the
offence; second, by constraining the women’s engagement with the police
investigation which, in turn, support officers’ (often gendered) inferences
about women’s roles in assisting and encouraging their partners.
For the women who were at the violent incident, the abuse and coercive
control perpetrated by their partner ensured that they remained in situ-
ations that were (sometimes unexpectedly) violent or (in a small number
of cases) that they assisted their partner in the commission of the offence,
for example by bringing the victim to the scene. Women’s inactivity in the
former and activity in the latter was driven by a complicated web of emo-
tions, including love, fear and co-dependence that they felt towards their
partner, which were all framed within a ‘continuum of coercion’ narrative
(Barlow 2016, p.69; see also Barlow 2019). Women’s engagement in the po-
lice investigation was further constrained by the abuse and coercion they
suffered, layered on top of a general distrust of the system due to being
repeatedly failed by institutions of the State during their short lives. Yet
despite these State failures, which were often routed in inaction, the system
was ready to leap into action at the point at which their abusive partner
was violent to another. In doing so, it condemned women to prison for
years and sometimes decades – for the women convicted of murder this
was for a minimum of between 15 and 23 years – despite them not having
been violent themselves. In this way the system further replicates the harms
of domestic abuse and coercive control by exposing women to regimes ‘of
threat and compliance, the potential for repercussions, and the uncertainty
of safety’ (Canning 2020, p.272). While the literature on co-offending has
successfully highlighted the role of abuse and coercive control in women’s
offending behaviour, this article offers a very rare insight into its role in
women being held responsible and criminalised for very serious violence
perpetrated by their abusive partner, in circumstances in which their be-
haviour is neither violent nor often, they argue, actively of assistance.
Given the ‘socio-political’ nature of coercive control (Stark 2009, p.1516)
and the systemic facilitators of such convictions, transforming such grossly
unfair outcomes for women requires structural change (Barlow and Weare
2019) and individual adjustments. Here I make three recommendations:
to educate the public and criminal justice practitioners to improve un-
derstanding of patterns of violence and coercive control; to develop a
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policy framework to support more informed legal practice in cases involv-
ing women as secondary parties; and to make available defences for women
who are compelled to assist in violent offences by their intimate partner. I
will describe each in turn.
A programme of public education would be important to form the basis
of more targeted training of professionals within the criminal justice sys-
tem (see Centre for Women’s Justice (2021) for similar recommendations;
see also Burman and Brooks-Hay (2018)). With its roots in gender inequal-
ity that are deeply embedded in our society, the work on coercive control
demonstrates the centrality of ‘unequal power relations’ (Welle and Falkin
2000, p.58) that cascade through the system. Coercive behaviour ‘coalesce
with normalized expectations of male and female behaviour’ (Burman and
Brooks-Hay 2018, p.75), which require challenge so that legal cases are
judged based on ‘an accurate and meaningful understanding of what is
really happening in these relationships’ (Hanna 2009, p.1458). The public
(the jury), police, lawyers and the judiciary may not understand the com-
plex nuances of a relationship in which a partner enacts coercive control
(Hanna 2009).
At its core, education would highlight gender stereotypes (that pitch
women as the ‘masterminds’ or ‘manipulators’ of men) and assumptions
about intimate relationships (about how much people ‘know’ about one
another’s actions) and the role of each in the process of criminalisation.
Gender stereotypes serve as a narrative blindfold, rendering women’s sta-
tus as victims unseen. Rather, the accounts of women in the studies re-
ported here demonstrate the relevance of the Victims’ Code to their trial
experiences, as it entitles women who are victims of abusive relationships
to ‘special measures’ in court (Ministry of Justice 2015). This might mean
women sitting separately from their co-defendant and giving evidence be-
hind a screen, for example.
Training itself, however, would not be enough (Walklate and Fitz-
Gibbon 2019). In addition to enhancing the recognition of women as victims
of their co-defendant’s violence, detailed policy guidelines on the appli-
cation of complicity liability to such cases would be necessary to counter
residual gender stereotyping. In a system that allows secondary parties
to be culpable for the substantive offence of another, based on inferences
about their intentions and knowledge of an incident, it is important that
the interpretation of ‘intention to encourage and assist’ and ‘knowledge of
the essential facts’ in legal practice (by police and lawyers) is scrutinised
to ensure that gendered stereotypes are not the basis for charge. As this
article and other research attests to, women routinely report that their in-
volvement in incidents with male partners is rooted in experiences of vi-
olence, coercion and fear, rather than their intention to encourage and
assist him in the commission of the substantive offence. To ensure a full
understanding of the dynamics between co-defendants who are intimate
partners, it is crucial that police and prosecution lawyers are required to
investigate the whole relationship, to take into account the breadth of expe-
riences that represent the continuum of coercion (Barlow 2016, p.69). Con-
necting the dots between behaviours ‘begins to paint a picture of coercive
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behaviour that recognizes the ongoing loss of autonomy the victim suffers.
From an evidentiary perspective, a complete narrative of the relationship is
relevant. This also allows the victim to tell her story – the whole story – and
have it matter’ (Hanna 2009, p.1462). As a result, it is hoped, fewer women
would be charged with serious violence in the first place. Policy guidelines
would also encourage key players further on in the criminal justice pro-
cess, including the judge and jury, to consider the broader context of the
relationship, rather than concentrating narrowly on the violent event itself
and should challenge concerns that disclosing experiences of abuse and
coercive control would be counterproductive for women.
Finally, my third recommendation is that defences are developed for
women who are found to have intended to assist or encourage the princi-
pal offender, but who felt compelled to do so due to multiple and accumu-
lated experiences of violence and abuse. This would build on the grow-
ing pressure to recognise the lower culpability of women who are victims
of domestic abuse (see Prison Reform Trust 2020). Defences that negate
or reduce women’s culpability in co-offending cases would recognise the
vastly different responsibility that falls on a person who commits the act of
serious violence itself and the person who commits no violence but feels
they must ‘assist’ the perpetrator for fear of their own violent victimisa-
tion. Proportionate punishment is a ‘requirement of justice’, as the ‘sever-
ity of punishment should be commensurate with the seriousness of the wrong’ (Von
Hirsch 1976, p.66, italics in original). Even if it is accepted that a person
ought to take ‘reasonable steps’ to inform the police or stop an offence, it
would seem fair and reasonable to convict them of a lesser offence than
the person who perpetrated the serious violence, on basis of fair labelling
(Ashworth 2006, p.417). As Midson (2016) states in relation to women who
kill their abusive partners and which seems even more relevant to women
who have almost always committed no violent act:
there is no ‘malice aforethought’ in the true sense of that phrase, despite the appear-
ance of willed action. The act is not malicious or angry – it is a normative response
to coercive conditions. On that basis, it is not just or fair to label these victims as
‘murderers’ or ‘killers’, even though the criminal justice system might rightly hold
them responsible to some degree. The criminal justice system would not classify as
morally blameworthy, someone who killed a hostage-taker in order to regain their
freedom. Yet women under coercive control are essentially hostages: they have no
autonomy over their own lives. The continual failure of the criminal justice system
to acknowledge this truth reinforces the notion that women’s lives matter less than
men’s. (p.441)
A modernised version of the now abolished ‘marital coercion’ defence, for
example (see also Jones 2008), or the adoption of a new defence which
recognises compulsion, would allow women’s assistance in an offence per-
petrated by a coercive partner to be negated.
As with any changes to the law and legal practice that impact on women,
the risks of these recommendations must be acknowledged: ‘There is a
complicated and often elusive relationship between state intervention and
women’s lives. Indeed, the more the law attempts to intervene to help
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women, the more it is likely that it will create new challenges and dilem-
mas for women. What may seem to be the right idea theoretically does not
always translate straightforwardly into practice. That is not to say that we
should not try. Rather, we should be cautiously optimistic in our attempts’
(Hanna 2009, p.1460). Risks in this context might include the increased ex-
pectation that women engage in the process (Hanna 2009; see also Stark
2009), exposing abusive experiences that they may find traumatic to dis-
cuss. This may be particularly unsafe initially as the public narrative falls
behind the type of academic evidence that pushes law forward and mean
that women continue to be exposed to very difficult cross-examinations, as
they are in trials of rape (Hanna 2009). There is also the risk of the exacer-
bation of ‘legal systems abuse’, as perpetrators of abuse achieve further con-
trol through the legal system itself (Walklate and Fitz-Gibbon 2019, p.102).
However, with attempts to minimise such risks in mind, change is
needed, as the work on coercive control ‘aptly illuminates, [that] what is at
stake for women in relationships involving interpersonal violence is free-
dom and autonomy, and the ability to actualize full citizenship’ (Hanna
2009, p.1459). What this article suggests is a travesty then is, in cases
involving women as secondary parties, the criminal justice system colludes
with the perpetrators of coercive control, who implicate their partners in
serious violence and, in doing so, further restricts these women’s freedom
and autonomy, sometimes for decades. I hope that telling the stories of
the women in this article contribute to similar stories that are increasingly
being told, like that of Sally Challen (see Justice for Women 2017), as
‘Telling one’s story not only can create empathy and understanding but it
also helps to reshape the law away from formal argumentation and toward
the true humanexperience (Murphy, 1993; White, 1990). It connects the
personal to the political and, in doing so, provides enormous opportunity
to reshape the law not only in individual cases but also systemically’
(Hanna 2009, p.1462).15
Notes
1 Jones (2008) questioned the exclusion of domestic abuse in the narratives of these
women.
2 The backdrop of abusive relationships with their co-defendants may help to explain
why women convicted of murder, as secondary parties, come to make sense of their
conviction by exaggerating their role in the offence (see Hulley, Crewe and Wright
2019).
3 As has been found more broadly among samples of male and female secondary par-
ties (Hulley, Crewe and Wright 2019), the women in Clarke and Chadwick’s research
were keen to ‘take responsibility’ for a lesser offence, but believed that their convic-
tion for serious violence was illegitimate (Clarke and Chadwick 2020, p.13).
4 While the House of Lords in 1975 (in D.P.P for Northern Ireland v. Lynch [1975] AC
653) allowed duress to be an available defence for a person charged as an accessory
to murder, they later retracted this, arguing in 1987 that this was ‘excessive’ and that
the precise scope of duress should be outlined in legislation (Smith 1989, p.2).
5 In surveys, only 50% of these women identified themselves being convicted using
‘joint enterprise’, highlighting the lack of understanding of this area of law. The dif-
ference was discovered when further investigation of the case was conducted online.
6 Note, some of the women were co-defendants in the same trial.
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7 While the article to here has utilised a language of ‘complicity liability’, the term
‘joint enterprise’ was used for the purpose of the research studies. This is because
it was more broadly understood and it has tended to include ‘parasitic accessorial
liability’, which was relevant to the cases of the women who were convicted prior to
2016 (all of those in the first study and two in the second).
8 This was also the case for the women convicted alone and alongside co-defendants
who were not their intimate partners.
9 All were convicted when aged 25 years or younger.
10 Since the focus of the interviews in the first study, in particular, was not the rela-
tionships between the co-defendants, it is not possible to say with any certainty how
many of those who did not disclose abuse in their intimate relationship with their co-
defendant did not experience any. Also, all those who reported suffering domestic
abusive and coercive control in their intimate relationship were with men.
11 Women also often reported their own attempts on their lives prior to imprisonment,
which were often related to the abuse they were suffering (see Aitken and Munro
2018) alongside other traumatic events, such as the death of a child.
12 Rosie expressed similar sentiments, having met her partner when he was in his early
20s and she was 15 years old. She described liking him: ‘[b]ecause he was older, which
makes you feel a little bit special because he could have anybody and I think it was
the first time in my life that I felt wanted by somebody. … it sounds really stupid
now’.
13 My thanks to the anonymous reviewer for drawing attention to the parallels between
these contexts.
14 Some women reported that their partner admitted sole responsibility for the crime
but the prosecution contested the confession and continued to prosecute the female
partner.
15 Acknowledgements: I would like to thank the women who shared their stories in each
of the studies reported on here. I also thank the two anonymous reviewers for their
valuable comments on this article. Further thanks to my colleagues, with whom I
undertook the two studies and who offered helpful comments on an early draft of
the article: Professor Ben Crewe, Dr Serena Wright and Dr Tara Young. This work
was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (ES/J007935/1 and
ESRC; ES/P001378/1) and the Isaac Newton Trust.
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